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RECENT CASES
ARREST WITHOUT VARRANT-REASONABLE GROUNDS-SUSPICION OF FEL-
ONY-The defendant, a sheriff in Michigan, arrested the plaintiff without a
warrant, on the strength of a telegram from the captain of detectives of South
Bend, Indiana, saying, "I hold warrant for F. G. Kratzer charge making false
statement, . . . arrest and advise." The charge against the plaintiff was
later dismissed and he sued for false imprisonment. Held: The defendant had
reasonable grounds to suspect that the plaintiff had committed a felony, and
the arrest was therefore justified. Krat-er v. Matthews, 207 N. V. 982 (Mich.,
1926).
An officer's right to arrest without a warrant one whom he suspects of
being a fugitive from another State has seldom been passed upon by the courts.
The weight of what little authority there is seems to be that the officer may
arrest if he has reasonable grounds to believe a felony has been committed, and
that the one he is arresting is the guilty person. Matter of Henry, 29 How. Pr.
185 (N. Y., 1865) ; State v. Whittle, 59 S. C. 297, 37 S. E. 923 (i9oo) ; State v.
Taylor, 70 Vt. I, 39 Atl. 447 (1898). No question of Federal law arises as it
has been decided that the Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 2, c1. 2, applies only to
extradition and not to an arrest in advance of requisition. Burton v. New York
Central R. R., 245 U. S. 315 (1917). In order to afford reasonable grounds
for his suspicion, the information to the officer must show that a felony has
been committed. The mere statement that an offense has been committed is
insufficient. Cunningham v. Baker, io4 Ala. i6o, i6 So. 68 (1893); Scott v.
Eldridge, 154 Mass. 25, 27 N. E. 677 (189i).
In the principal case the words "charge making false statement" state only
that an offense, and not a felony, has been committed, as the dissenting opinion
points out, and it is therefore submitted that the court erroneously held the
telegram to be reasonable ground for the defendant to suspect that a felony
had been committed.
BILLS AND NoTES-LIABILITY OF INDORSER-NOTE INDORSED AS COLLAT-
ERAL-The plaintiff sued defendant as endorser of a promissory note of a third
party, pledged as collateral to secure a loan by the plaintiff to the defendant. As
a partial defense, the defendant alleged the transferring of the note as.collateral
for the loan, the satisfaction of part of the loan, and a tender of the balance,
which plaintiff declined, it being less than the amount of the note sued upon.
Held: The plaintiff could not recover the full amount of the note. The per-
sonal endorsement by the defendant cannot be said to be collateral security to
his already existing personal obligation for the debt. Mercantile Factor's Corp.
v. W~arner Bros., 214 N. Y. Supp. 273 (1926).
It is well settled that the holder of paper given as collateral may recover
the full amount due upon it, although this exceed the debt for which it was
pledged, unless it is held subject to equitable defenses which the maker may
have against his payee. Packard -v. Abell, 113 N. Y. Supp. ioo5 (igog) ; Cam-
den National Bak v. Fries-Breslin Co., 214 Pa. 395, 63 AtL ioaa (i9o6);
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JONES, COLLATERAL SECURITIES AND PLEDGES, 804 (3rd ed. 1912). Any surplus
after the satisfaction of his debt will be held by him for the pledgor. Ducasse
v. Ke3.ser, 28 La. Ann. 419 (1876); Plant Mfg. Co. v. Fahey, 20 Wis. 200
(1866). But the court in the instant case held that this rule did not apply, be-
cause the plaintiff, by bringing suit against the debtor upon his endorsement
instead of upon the debt, cannot convert the suit into a suit upon the collateral,
for a debtor cannot by adding another obligation of his own to that which he
is already obligated to pay, create a second obligation as collateral to the first.
The court reasoned that a debtor's own personal obligation is no part of his
personal property and cannot be the subject of such a pledge-is a liability and
not an asset. In re Waddell-Entz Co., 67 Conn. 324, 35 Atl. 257 (1896);
Dies v. Wilson County Bank, 129 Tenn. 89, i65 S. W. 248 (1914) ; Internal.
Trust Co. v. Unios Cattle Co., 3 Wyo. 803, 31 Pac. 408 (1892).
It is submitted that the decision in the instant case is correct. But it is
illogical to say, as does the court here, that this is not a suit upon the collateral,
because the note was given as collateral and the suit was upon defendant's en-
dorsement of the note, and not upon the original debt. The real reason the
plaintiff cannot recover the full amount of the note is that as between a debtor
and a creditor, the creditor can only recover the amount owed to him. Circuity
of action is thereby avoided and the rights of the parties effectually settled.
CARRIERS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-RIGHT OF PRIVATE CARRIER TO USE OF
HIGHwAYs-The California Railroad Commission ordered a private carrier to
cease operating its trucks on the highways unless, and until, the Commission
should grant it a certificate of public convenience and necessity, as provided by
Cal. Stats. 1917, 330, Cal. Codes and Gen. Laws 1917-21, i68o. By amendment
to the original statute, the jurisdiction of the Commission had been extended to
private carriers. Cal. Stats. 1919, p. 457, § 2. Upon application to review the
order of the Commission, it was contended that the power of the state to pre-
vent one from making the highway his place of business was limited to com-
mon carriers. Held: The state may completely prohibit the use of its high-
ways by a private carrier. Holmes v. Railroad Commission of California, 242
Pac. 486 (Cal., 1925).
It is well settled that the right of a common carrier to use the public high-
ways for the conduct of his business is not a right, but a privilege which the
legislature may grant or withhold in its discretion. Lutz v. New Orleans,
235 Fed. 978 (D. C., 1916); Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, 168 Pac.
516 (1917) ; Ex parte Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S. E. 781 (i915). The reason
for the rule permitting the state to so exclude common carriers is not that they
are common carriers, but that they are using the public highway as a private
place of business or as the chief instrumentality in conducting such business.
Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. New York, r94 N. Y. i9, 86 N. E. 824 (i909);
Cummins v. Jones, 79 Ore. 276, 155 Pac. 171 (1916) ; Greene v. San Antonio,
178 S. NV. 6 (Tex. Civ. Ap., 1915).
In the principal case, the court held that the reason for exclusion applied
with equal force to private carriers, and in so holding, maintained the position
taken in an earlier decision, where the same court treated the question involved
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as one of first impression. Frost v. Railroad Commission, 240 Pac. 26 (Cal.,
1925). The language used in several cases would seem to indicate an accord
with the principal case. Cf. Le Blanc v. New Orleans, 138 La. 243, 70 So. 212
(1915); Allen v. Bcllingham, 95 Wash. z2, 163 Pac. x8 (1917); Ex Parte
Dickey, supra. In one case, moreover, it has been impliedly held that a statute
in many respects similar to the California statute applied to all persons whether
they were common carriers or not. State v. Price, i22 Wash. 421, 210 Pac. 787
(1922).
A state may not, by mere legislative fiat or constitutional enactment, trans-
mute a private carrier into a common carrier and impose upon it public duties,
as such transmutation is beyond the police power of the state and violative of
the Fourteenth Amendment in that it constitutes taking private property for
public use without compensation. Producers Trans. Co. v. Railroad Commis-
sion, 251 U. S. 228 (i919) ; Michigan Public Utilities Comm. v. Duke, 266
U. S. 570 (z925) ; Allen v. Railroad Commission, 179 Cal. 68, 89, 175 Pac. 466
(igx8). It is submitted that the effect of the holding in the principal case is
to subject the private carrier to the same regulations and restrictions, as a
common carrier and so constitute such transmutation as is expressly forbidden.
CEMETERIES-EASEMENTS--VIOLATION By BURIAL-The defendant ceme-
tery association permitted the burial of a human body in one of the alleyways
adjoining the plaintiff's burial lot, necessitating that the plaintiff walk over the
grave to gain access to her lot. Plaintiff brings this action for the violation
of her easement over the alleyway. Held: Plaintiff could recover. Dunbar v.
Oconomowac Cemetery Ass'n, 207 N. W. 265 (Wis., z926).
It is the general rule that the owner of a cemetery lot receives an ease-
ment of passage to his lot over the roads and alleys of the cemetery. Seymour
v. Page, 33 Conn. 61 (1865); Mt. Greenwood Cemetery Assn. v. Hildebrand,
126 I1 App. 399 Ct. (x9o6); Burke v. Wall, 29 La. Ann. 38 (1877). In re-
spect to the easement and the rights accruing thereunder, it is the accepted
law that the owner of a right of way over the land of another is entitled only
to a reasonable and usual enjoyment thereof in view of all the circumstances
of the case, and the owner of the soil is entitled to all the rights and benefits
of ownership consistent with the easement. Burnham v. Nevins, 144 Mass. 88,
1o N. E. 494 (1887) ; Grinell Bros. v. Brown, 205 Mich. 134, 171 N. W. 399
(1919) ; Abney v. Twombly, 39 R. I. 304, 97 AtI. 8o6 (xg6).
Since the above rule bases the rights of the parties upon the test of rea-
sonable use, the issue in the principal case resolves itself into the question of
whether the use of land as a passage way is reasonably interfered with byr the
use of it as a burial ground. The principal case holds that, even though there
was no physical obstruction, the defendant's act was a violation of the plain-
tiff's easement by reason of the prevailing sentiment among people not to pass
over a spot where a body is interred. While no cases have been found sustain-
ing a similar application of the rule, there is nothing in the general rule which
limits the test to physical obstructions, and so there should be no objection to
its application to a case where the interference results from acts which run
counter to the.prevailing public sentiments. It cannot be seriously doubted
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that it is the prevailing sentiment that land in which bodies are buried is sacred
and should not be trod upon. Viewed from that angle, the defendant's act
certainly interfered with the plaintiff's easement.
This sentiment, moreover, has received judicial recognition. In several
instances the courts have held that "the same land cannot properly be used for
buriol lots and for a highway at the same time. The two uses are inconsistent
with each other, and the one practically excludes the other." Evergreen Ceme-
Icry Assn. v. City of New Haven, 43 Conn. 234 (1875) ; Ritter v. Crouch, 71
W. Va. 221, 224, 76 S. E. 428, 429 (1912). The above statements, while not
made in cases involving easements of a lot owner, show that the courts are in
sympathy with the public view. It is therefore suggested that the court in the
principal case arrived at a correct and just conclusion in the light of the un-
usual facts which confronted it.
DiVORcE-DEFEXSE.s--REFUSAL OF SEXUAL INTERCOURsE-The plaintiff wife
and the defendant husband were married by a civil ceremony, but entered into
an agreement not to carry on sexual relations until the performance of a re-
ligious ceremony. Though the plaintiff had been willing to have the ceremony
performed, the defendant had refused, and, as a result, they did not live with
each other. Plaintiff then sued for separation and maintenance on ground
of abandonment since defendant refused to furnish a home. The defense was
the plaintiff's refusal of sexual intercourse. Held: Judgment for defendant.
Mirizio v. Mirizio, i5o N. E. 6o5 (N. Y., 1926).
The New York Civil Practice Act, Laws 1920, C. 925, § 1163, provides:
"The defendant in an action for separation may set up, in justification, the mis-
conduct of the plaintiff." The Appellate Division in Risk v. Risk, 2o2 App.
Div. 299, 195 N. Y. Supp. 536 (1922), held that the refusal of sexual inter-
course was not such misconduct as was contemplated by the statute. It based
its decision on the doctrine that acts justifying desertion must be such as would
amount to a desertion so as to support a decree of divorce or separation. Under-
wood z,. Underwood, 271 Fed. 553 (D. C., i92i); Golden v. Golden, 36 Pa.'
Super. 648 (i9o8). The great weight of authority is that refusal of sexual
intercourse is not desertion as ground for divorce. Jackson v. Jackson [1924]
P. ig; Southwick v. Southwick, 97 Mass. 327 (1867) ; Cunningliain v. Cunning-
han,, 6o Pa. Super. 624 (i915). The court expressly overruled Risk v. Risk,
holding that the marriage was complete by the laws of New York, the wife had
breached her obligations, and was therefore guilty of misconduct and of an
act that justified desertion. The court is supported by the minority view.
Campbell v. Campbell, 149 Mich. 147, 112 N. W. 481 (igo7) ; Parmly v. Parmly,
9o N. J. Eq. 49o, io6 Ati. 456 (i919). The latter case, however, qualified its
holding by speaking of "unjustified" refusal. See note, io COR,-. L. Q. 374
(1925).
One of the two dissenting opinions in the principal case regarded the re-
fusal as justified. In opposition to the majority opinion it pointed out that
while collateral agreements should on general grounds of public policy not be
allowed to change the legal obligations arising out of marriage; see 74 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 629 (1926) ; this agreement, based on religious and moral sentiments
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wlihch society wants to encourage, should be considered in determining which
party was guilty of misconduct. Once the agreement is -considered, the miscon-
duct is not the plaintiff's but the defendant's. It is submitted that the reason-
ing of the dissenting opinion, which is that of the weight of authority, is to be
preferred.
INTERSTATE COMMFRCE-PLANT QUARANTINE-VALIDITY OF STATE LAw-
A State statute empowered the State Director of Agriculture to establish such
quarantine as might be necessary to keep out of the state diseased plants and
injurious insects. Quarantine was established against the alfalfa weevil, and
an injunction was granted to prohibit the carriage of alfalfa into the state
from portions of surrounding states where the weevil was widely distributed.
Held: Decree reversed. Oregon-Washington R. R. & Nav. Co. v. Washing-
ton, Supreme Court of the United States, March z, 1926.
The power to regulate interstate commerce is plenary, and action by Con-
gress within that power is supreme. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. x (U. S.,
1824). Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit
only of one uniform system or plan of regulation, are exclusively within the
Federal power, while those which are local-in character may be regulated by the
states until Congress enacts legislation which manifests the intention to regu-
late exclusively. Cooley v. Phila. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 29 (U. S.,
185z). The establishment of quarantine under the police power of the state
falls within the latter class. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 (19o2). In situ-
ations which have arisen heretofore where Congress has enacted quarantine
laws, they have been held to be in aid of similar state laws and not in conflict
with them; Compagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 186 U. S. 380, 396 Cx9o)
(human beings); Reid v. Colorado, supra (animals) ; Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.
S. 251 (1908) (animals) ; although it is fundamental that the state quarantine
law could not stand in case of a conflict with the Federal statute.
In the instant case, the Act of 1912, 37 STAT. 315, c. 3O8, as amended by
the Act of 1917, 39 STAT. 1165, c- 179, was held to show the intention of Con-
gress to take over, through the Department of Agriculture, entire control of
injurious plant diseases and insects in interstate commerce, thereby excluding
action by the states. Congress thus had created broader powers than in the sim-
ilar cases cited above. Quarantine laws have been generally recognized as of
a local nature, and have been left to the states to control. See Morgan v.
Louisiana, 1i8 U. S. 455, 466 (1886). To place this control in "a far-off and
perhaps supine federal bureau," is a departure the policy of which is doubtful.
NEcLIGENcE-LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR NoN-ComPUANcE WITH CHILD
LABOR ACT-EFFECT OF MISREPRESENTATION aY CHrLD--The plaintiff, who was
injured while working at defendant's printing press, was under sixteen years
of age and was employed in violation of a statute making such employment un-
lawful in that occupation and requiring the filing of a certificate of age from
the superintendent of schools. Plaintiff misrepresented his age to the defend-
ant as being over sixteen but the defendant had not filed the required certificate.
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Moreover, the plaintiff appeared to be over the required age. Held: Plaintiff
may recover. Kno.rville .c-ws Co. v. 'Spitcer, 279 S. W. 1043 (Tenn., 1926).
It is the unquestioned law in the vast majority of jurisdictions that the em-
ployment of a child contrary to the provisions of the Child Labor Act consti-
tutes negligence ter se in the employer towards the child. Kiicke v. Allegheny
Steel Co., 2oo Fed. 933 (C. C. A., 1912) ; Mylett v. Montrose Cloak Co., 211
Mo. App. 635, 249 S. NN. 97 (1923) ; Stinc v. Mayer Boot Co., 163 Wis. isi, 156
N. W. 971 (i916). Contra: Berdos v. Tremont Mills, 209 Mass. 489, 95 N. E.
876 (19I1), holding that the negligence is a matter of fact in each case and
not negligence per se. Furthermore, by the great weight of authority such
employment is per se the proximate cause of the injury. Trust Co. v. Peterson
Co., 219 Mich. 208, 189 N. W. 186 (1922) ; Karpeles v. Hein, 227 N. Y. 74,
124 N. E. ioI (i918) ; Chabot -. Glass Co., 259 Pa. 504, 1o3 Atl. 283 (1918).
When the injured child is bringing the suit, the courts almost universally
hold that his misrepresentations as to his age do not preclude recovery. The
reasons given for these decisions are many: that the protection given by the
statute is absolute and cannot be waived by the child; that since the statute
was made to protect the child against his own immature judgment, his consent
cannot be given to the risks of the employment which by his immature judg-
ment he has decided to take; or that the policy of the statute to protect children-
would be defeated if the employer were allowed to set up this defense. Beau-
champ v. Sturges, 25o Ill. 3o3, 95 N. E. 204 (1911) ; Lesko z. Liondale Dye Co.,
93 N. J. L. 4, io7 Atd. 275 (i919) ; Krutlies z,. Coal Co., 249 Pa. 162, 94 AtI. 459
(1915).
The basic theory of these decisions ig undoubtedly the policy of protecting
the life and health of children. Such a theory necessitates the taking of an
objective view of the situation, an attitude which is most unusual in tort law.
If the subjective view were taken, that is, the view which considers the actual
state of mind of the parties, there is no doubt that the plaintiff would be
estopped. This objective theory is an anomaly in the law of torts but one which
now seems too well settled to be questioned.
SEDUCTION-CIvIL LIABILITY OF THE SEDUCER TO THE SEDUCED FEMALE-
The defendant, a minor, seduced a girl under eighteen. The girl's mother, the
plaintiff, sued on behalf of her daughter to recover damages for the seduction.
Held: The plaintiff may recover. Brunet v. Deshotels, 107 So. mi (La., 1926).
At common law a father could sue for the seduction of his daughter on
the theory that as master he had suffered through the loss of her services.
Mercer v. Walnsley, 5 Har. & J. 27 ('Md., 182o); Bartley v. Richimyer, 4
N. Y. 38 (i85o). The seduced female herself, however, had no right of action,
for she had consented to the intercourse and, impliedly, to any injury that might
result. Burks v. Shami, 2 Bibb 341 (Ky., i8II) ; Oberlin z,. Upson, 84 Ohio
I1, 95 N. E. 511 (i911). fany states have now adopted statutes enabling
a woman to sue for her own seduction. Anthony v. Norton, 60 Kan. 341, 56
Pac. 529 (x899) ; Hood v. Sudderth, iii N. C. 215, 16 S. E. 397 (1892)-. But
there is no such statute in Louisiana, and it has been held there that the seduced
woman cannot recover. Carson z,. Slattery, 123 La. 825, 49 So. 586 (19o9);
Oz'erhultz v. Row, 152 La. 1O, 92 SO. 716 (1922).
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The principal case was distinguished from these cases on the ground that
the girl was under eighteen years of age and by statute incapable of consenting
to sexual intercourse. Laws of 1912, Act No. z92, i La. Const. and Stat.'(Wolff,
1920) 398. A similar case was decided the same way in Oklahoma where also
there was no statute permitting a woman to sue for her own seduction. Priboth
,v. Haveron, 41 Okla. 692, 139 Pac. 973 (1914). Recovery has also been allowed
in actions for damages for the unlawful intercourse or for assault on the ground
that the statutes make it impossible for the girl to consent. Bishop v. Liston,
112 Neb. 559, x99 N. \V. 825 (1924); Boyles v. Blankenhorn, 168 App. Div. 388,
153 N. Y. Supp. 466 (i915), aff'd 220 N. Y. 624, 115 N. E. 443 (I917) ; ltman
v. Eckerinann. 132 S. NV. 523 (Tex. Civ. App., i9io).
These cases are to be distinguished from those where two parties, in spite
of their mutual consent, are allowed to recover against each other for injuries
received in an affray in breach of the peace, and from those where a woman
who has consented to an abortion upon herself recovers against the person who
performed the illegal operation. In such cases, the interest of the state in pre-
serving the peace, on the one hand, and the illegality of the operation on the
other, are given as the reasons for recovery. See Bohlen, Consent as Affecting
Civil Liability for Breaches of the Peace, 24 CoL. L. REv. 8ig (1924).
In two American jurisdictions and ini England, prior to 1922, it was held
that if consent had actually been given by a girl below the statutory age for
consent, her seducer could not be convicted for assault with intent to rape, or
indecent assault, since consent negatives the idea of assault. That is, her con-
sent is valid, but cannot be pleaded as a defense in a criminal action-of rape.
Regina v. Martin, 9 Car. & P. 213 (Eng., 1839) ; State v. Pickett, ii Nev. 255
(1876) ; Smith v. State, 12 Ohio St. 466 (i861). But see 6o L. R. Stat. 6o8, 12
and 13 Geo. V, c. 56, I (1922)), providing that consent is no defense to an action
of indecent assault on an infant; and Rex. v. Forde, [1923] 2 K B. 400. In
these jurisdictions it would follow that the girl could not succeed in a civil.ac-
tion, though no cases on that point seem to have arisen. The general rule,
however, is that the girl cannot consent to the assault any more than she can
to the intercourse. State v. Jackson, 65 N. 3. L., 105, 46 AtI. 764 (igoo) ; State
v. Clark, 77 Vt. lo, 58 At. 796 (1904).
Thui, fundamentally, the instant case is in accord with the general Amer-
ican view. It may be questioned, nevertheless, whether the judgment was prop-
erly given for the plaintiff, since Louisiana has no statute permitting a woman
to sue for her own seduction.
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-CONFLICT BETwFE "PERsONAL" AND "SEIZED"-
The testator left a will in which the following was the only dispositive pro-
vision: "I give and bequeath to X all my personal property to which I may
die seized and possessed or to which I may be entitled at the time of my de-
cease. I authorize her to sell and dispose of all and everything belonging to
me and give title to same." The testator died owning real as well as personal
property. Held: Both real and personal property passed under the will. West
.I West, 213 N. Y. Supp. 480 (App. Div., 1926).
It is apparent that the will was the work of a layman who did not under-
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stand the language he used. The problem presented to the court is to determine
just what the testator intended by the language which he employed. Ph1illip's
Estate, 205 Pa. 5o4, 55 AtI. 210 (1903) ; Woelppcr's Appeal, 126 Pa. 562, 17
Atl. 87o (1889). In determining this intention all parts of the will are to be
zonsidered. By the heavy weight of authority, however, nothing outside the
will may be considered since the inconsistency between the words "personal"
and "seized" is patent. Engclthaler z,. Engelthaler, 186 Ill. 230, 63 N. E 669
(x918) ; Bruce v. Bruce, 9o N. J. Eq. x8, io5 At. 492 (i918) ; Jennings v.
Talbert, 77 S. C. 454, 58 S. E. 42o (i9o7).
The words "seized and possessed or to which I may be entitled" with the
power to sell everything, plus the fact that this is the only dispositive provision,
seem to indicate that the testator's intention was to dispose of all his estate,
real and personal. Such being the solution of the problem, the word "per-
sonal" is the one which cannot have its ordinary meaning. The court decided
that it meant "own," reading the phrase "my own property." The word may
equally well be omitted, as the court points out. Giving the word some such
meaning as the court gives it, or omitting it, leaves the remaining parts of the
will entirely consistent, passing all the property. The court is aided to some
extent in arriving at these conclusions by a presumption against partial intestacy,
which, in New York, arises from the mere fact of making a will. Hadcox v.
Cody, 213 N. Y. 570, io8 N. E. 84 (i915). Any other construction of the will-
than the one above would cause an intestacy as to the real estate.
Cases like the present one present difficult problems, the solutions of which
are not always free from doubt. Thus the construction in the principal case
decides that the testator misunderstood the meaning of the word "personal"
rather than the word "seized," which is most unlikely. Furthermore, the words
"give and bequeath" are used, and these are appropriate to the disposition of
personal property. It is, however, submitted that the intention of the testator
was properly determined by the court, first, because, from the language which
he used, he seems to have intended to dispose of all his property, and, secondly,
because of the presumption against partial intestacy.
